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Title:
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On the Evolutionary Fitness of Bounded Rationality Heterogeneous Populations
in Antagonistic Interactions |
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Author(s):
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Tasos Patokos |
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Source:
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American
Journal of Applied Sciences:1-13 |
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Abstract: |
Conventional game theory assumes hyper-rational players, while
evolutionary game theory abandons the assumption. This paper studies what
happens when agents of both profiles co-exist and get engaged in a series
of antagonistic interactions (the Hawk-Dove game). It is shown that if
rational agents are perfectly informed as to the type of their opponent,
they find it optimal to be always aggressive (that is, always select
“Hawk”) when paired with an irrational player. It is then shown that,
generally, a similar result is also valid when rational agents fail to
recognize the type of their opponent with certainty. Finally, a discussion
is provided on why it may be fruitful to consider heterogeneous
populations as to the rationality of agents.
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Title:
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An Experimental Study of Petty Corrupt Behaviour in Small Decision Making
Problems
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Author(s):
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Takemi Fujikawa
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Source:
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American
Journal of Applied Sciences : 14-18 |
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Abstract: |
This research discusses small decision making problems and petty
corruption as their practical applications with a structured economic
experiment. One of examples of petty corruption considered includes
demands for petty bribes by traffic officials followed by police. We
examine that it is caused by subjective underweighting of rare events and
its objective probabilities. This literature reports results of an
experiment, which reveals that the subjects tended to subjectively
underweight rare outcomes when they relied on feedback in small decision
making problems. Underweighting of rare events lead the subjects to choose
a risky option often, but not all the time, to maximise his/her expected
utility. This tendency is the opposite of the overweighting of rare
outcomes observed in mainstream big description-based decision problems.
It is revealed that an individual petty corrupt behaviour is a consequence
of the theoretically-optimal behaviour for the risk-seeking
decision-maker. This is examined along with the expected utility model.
The model well captures results of the experiment and it asserts that it
is theoretically-optimal decision to do the petty corrupt behaviour (to
receive petty bribes) occasionally for the risk-seeking official, who
subjectively underweight rare event and its probability.
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Title:
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Publicly Funded Education and Human Capital in the Presence of a
Convex-Concave Education Function |
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Author(s):
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Binh Tran-Nam and Công Nghê Truong |
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Source:
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American
Journal of Applied Sciences : 19-26 |
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Abstract: |
This study investigates an aggregative optimal growth model in which
short-lived individuals obtain their labour skill through education. The
process of human capital formation is described by an increasing,
convex-concave education function relating the success rate to the
educational expenditure per student. The cost of education is publicly
funded by an income tax imposed on adult workers. Despite the apparent
regularity and rationality of this idealized economy, it is shown that the
existence of the steady state of the model is not guaranteed. In fact, the
steady state only exists for carefully chosen social time rates of
preference. However, the steady state, if it exists, is unique and in terms
of local stability, a saddle point. |
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Title:
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The Possibility of Cyclical Behavior in a Class of Dynamic Models |
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Author(s):
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Anjan Mukherji |
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Source:
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American
Journal of Applied Sciences : 27-38 |
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Abstract: |
The paper
investigates conditions under which endogenous cyclic behavior may be
observed within the context of Predator-Prey (Lotka-Volterra) Models. The
analysis also establishes conditions under which such behavior is
non-existent and hence establishes conditions for global convergence to the
interior equilibrium, whenever it exists. The results are then applied to
two diverse sets of economic exercises and shows how the conclusions of
those exercises may be established under a much weaker set of assumptions.
Based on these discussions, a numerical example of robust periodic behavior
is provided.
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Title:
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Imperfectly-Rational Agents, Volatility of Reserves and Customer Markets |
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Author(s):
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Partha Gangopadhyay and Renu Gangopadhyay |
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Source:
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American
Journal of Applied Sciences : 39-44 |
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Abstract: |
Potential
customers in customer markets are typically dichotomised into actual and
prospective customers. If the firm holds its price firm, the actual
customers hold their reserves/reservation price firm and repeat their
purchases. On the other hand, prospective customers’ reserves may be
volatile due to their non-equilibrium market experience. One may regard a
prospective buyer with a volatile reserve as imperfectly rational. On the
other hand, one may suppose that an actual customer with a firm reserve is
fully rational. We examine this hitherto-neglected asymmetry in customer
markets to highlight that a firm can use imperfectly rational and
prospective customers - characterised by their volatile reserves - as a
European option. As the volatility increases, so does the value of the
option of selling the products to the prospective customers. We also
establish that volatility of reserves and hence imperfection in rationality
of buyers, can have positive impact on output and employment in customer
markets. |
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Title:
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Learning Dynamics in the Cobweb Model with Heterogeneous Producers |
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Author(s):
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Carl Chiarella and Xue-Zhong He |
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Source:
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American
Journal of Applied Sciences : 45-56 |
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Abstract: |
In this study we
investigate the nonlinear dynamics of the traditional cobweb model with two
types of heterogeneous producers who are risk averse and seek to learn the
distribution of asset prices, in terms of the sample mean and variance of
historical prices, using the arithmetic learning processes (ALP) over
different window lengths. We show that heterogeneity has a double edged
effect on the dynamics in the sense that heterogeneous learning can
stabilize an otherwise unstable dynamics in some cases and destablize an
otherwise stable dynamics in other cases as well. When the steady state
becomes unstable, the model displays complicated dynamics through a variety
of types of bifurcations. |
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Title:
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Rational Rules of Thumb in Finite Dynamic Games: N-person Backward Induction
with Inconsistently Aligned Beliefs and Full Rationality |
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Author(s):
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Yanis Varoufakis |
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Source:
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American
Journal of Applied Sciences : 57-60 |
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Abstract: |
Recent work has cast considerable doubt on the plausibility of specific
assumptions about how rational agents form out-of-equilibrium beliefs in
finite extensive games in which beliefs are induced backwards. The point is
that the resulting consistently aligned beliefs are incoherent in view of
the counterfactuals they rely on. This paper asks: how will the possibility
of inconsistently aligned beliefs affect the manner in which rational
players play such games? It shows that, provided beliefs are aligned
monotonically, some of the interesting qualitative features of the
conventional approach remain unchanged. |
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Title:
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Irrationality in the Neoclassical Definition of Rationality |
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Author(s):
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Steve Keen |
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Source:
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American
Journal of Applied Sciences : 61-68 |
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Abstract: |
In this study we
are not arguing that competition as it actually occurs in practice is not
socially beneficial. Our criticism is directed instead at the false belief
that rational profit-maximizing behavior and competition as defined by
neoclassical economic theory will lead to a welfare-maximizing
outcome-again, as defined by neoclassical theory. |
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Title:
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Long Cycles in Employment, Inflation and Real Unit Wage Costs
Qualitative Analysis and Quantitative Assessment |
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Author(s):
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Peter Flaschel, Göran Kauermann and Timo Teuber |
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Source:
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American
Journal of Applied Sciences : 69-77 |
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Abstract: |
In this study we
have provided some theoretical foundations for the empirical hypothesis that
there exist clockwise-oriented long-phased fluctuations in the core
variables unemployment rate, 1-e and inflation rate, on the one hand and
employment rate e and real unit-wage costs, on the other hand. We have at
first presented two simple prototype models of inflation, stagflation and
disinflation in the spirit of Friedman’s reflection of such issues and of
employment and real unit-wage costs (or the wage share) in the spirit of
Goodwin’s[1] growth cycle model. It has already been observed by Atkinson[2]
that in particular models of the Goodwin type tend towards long-phased
fluctuations in employment and the wage share for reasonable parameter
values. It may however be somewhat surprising that the same holds true (for
reasonable sizes of the parameter in the employed Phillips curve) for the
employment rate / inflation cycle as well, a cycle mechanism that is
formally identical to the Goodwin one as we have shown. We thus arrived at
the conclusion that there are cycles with a phase length much longer than
the ordinary business cycle (in fact approximately five times as long as we
saw in the empirical phase plots of the paper) which are not long waves from
a Schumpeterian perspective, but caused by the fact that systematic changes
in real unit-wage costs and also in inflation caused by changes in the
(un-)employment rate may be slow, giving rise to interchanging long-lasting
regimes of economic prosperity on the one hand and economic stagnation on
the other hand.
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Title:
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Price-Taking in General Equilibrium |
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Author(s):
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Murray C. Kemp |
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Source:
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American
Journal of Applied Sciences : 78-80 |
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Abstract: |
In this study we
investigate the nonlinear dynamics of the traditional cobweb model with two
types of heterogeneous producers who are risk averse and seek to learn the
distribution of asset prices, in terms of the sample mean and variance of
historical prices, using the arithmetic learning processes (ALP) over
different window lengths. We show that heterogeneity has a double edged
effect on the dynamics in the sense that heterogeneous learning can
stabilize an otherwise unstable dynamics in some cases and destabilize an
otherwise stable dynamics in other cases as well. When the steady state
becomes unstable, the model displays complicated dynamics through a variety
of types of bifurcations.
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